capital from their best uses. By calculating the deadweight costs of taxation, we can gauge die potential effects of taxation on die economy and society and calculate die least cosdy combination of taxes.
The size of deadweight costs is influenced by a range of factors, but is likely to be largest when the acdons of producers and consumers are highly responsive to after-tax prices, when exisdng marginal tax rates are high and when savings are highly responsive to after-tax returns.
Other Studies of Deadweight Costs
An earlier study by Diewert and Lawrence (1994, 1995) for New Zealand did much to raise die awareness of die deadweight costs of taxadon among policy-makers and the general community. The key findings of die study were diat the deadweight costs associated widi labour taxation increased from 5 per cent to over 18 per cent in the 20 years up to 1991. Over die same period die marginal excess burden of consumpdon taxadon (all indirect taxes odier dian property taxes and import dudes) increased from 5 per cent to around 14 per cent.
However, while our first study made a number of advances in die measurement of deadweight costs, die esdmates obtained are likely to be reladvely conscrvadve. By esdmadng a stadc model we were not able to calculate die marginal excess bur den of capital taxadon. Odier studies which have attempted to introduce dynamics and model capital accumuladon decisions have shown diat die marginal excess bur den of capital taxadon is generally higher dian dial for labour given capital's far greater mobility. This is especially likely to be the case for small open economies such as Australia and New Zealand trailing in a world of ever-increasing capital mobility and globalisadon.
A few previous studies have attempted to estimate marginal excess burdens for Australia, notably diose of Findlay and Jones (1982) , Han (1996) and Campbell and Bond (1997) . However, diese studies all use stadc models and concentrate on la bour and commodity taxadon. While capital tax deadweight losses are likely to be far higher, studies diat have successfully quandfied diem are rare, owing to die con ceptual and implementation difliculdes associated widi building dynamic models. The work of Jorgenson and Yun (1991) in die United States is one important excepdon.
Tax Rates on Capital
In calculadng die deadweight costs caused by taxadon we need to know die size of the 'wedges' taxes impose between die price paid by die consumer or user and the price received by die producer or supplier. Tax rates on labour and capital returns are presented in Figure 1 .
Changes to the Australian tax system since die mid-1980s have fallen reladvely heavily on capital. The average tax rate on labour income increased over die 28-
The database used in die study is described in Diewert and Lawrence (1997).
year period up to 1994 from 12.5 per cent in 1967 to 23.3 per cent in 1994. The labour tax rate peaked in 1989 at 26.4 per cent. After starting at 28.9 per cent, capi tal tax rates progressively declined to a rate of 19.9 per cent in 1981. Since then capital tax rates have again increased steadily, up to 42.7 per cent 1994. This in crease in die overall rate of capital tax can be attributed to the introduction of capital gains taxes, increasing reliance on transactions taxes and the progressive tightening of exemptions from the tax base.
Figure 1
Labour and capital tax rates, 1967-94
S o u rce: D iew ert a n d L aw ren ce (1 9 9 7 ).
Capital Tax Deadweight Costs Are High
Our estimated capital tax marginal excess burdens are presented in Figure 2 . For each year, die marginal excess burden represents die incremental loss of net output divided by die incremental increase in tax revenue induced by an increase in die capital tax rate. The esdmates are derived from an econometric model of the producdon sector described in die appendix to diis paper and summarised in Diewert and Lawrence (1997) . After starting from a figure of 21 per cent in 1967, the capital tax marginal ex cess burden climbed to a high of 28 per cent in the late 1970s. It then fell back to a low of 21 per cent again in 1983. Over die last decade, however, the capital tax marginal excess burden has climbed steadily to finish at a high of 48 per cent in 1994.
Policy Implications
What are the implications of these results? The essential implication is that, tar from being free, government expenditure comes with a high price tag and must correspondingly be spent wisely on high-yielding projects or not at all. To be justified, a government project must not only provide die going return on the amount spent but must provide an additional return which covers the deadweight cost associated with raising that revenue.
Figure 2
Capital tax marginal excess burdens, 1967-94 o>o*-cvjco' <*»«<0r^coo>OT-csjoo, 'tirt<or^coo> <pf^fs»fs.rs»f^r^f^f^.fss.r^.ooQocoooooooaocoooao <5>cno>o>o>cno>o>o>o>o>CT>o>o>o>o>o>o>o>o>o> Source: Diewert and Lawrence (1997) .
The precise nature of the penalty this imposes on government projects depends on die nature of die project. There is an important difference between government expenditure on investments which provide a stream of returns over dine and recurrent expenditure projects.
Consider first die case where die government raises an extra dollar of revenue from capital taxes and dien invests diis dollar in a perpetual project diat earns $ rin each period. In die following period die level of capital taxadon returns to its old level but die government condnues to receive die return from die dollar invested in die perpetual project. Let die discount rate be R. Then die discounted stream of benefits diat die project earns (/i) is:
(1) B = iiR .
If we assume die deadweight cost associated widi raising capital taxadon is d dien die above present value of benefits can be set equal to die current cost of (1 + d) and we can solve for die ongoing return r diat would be required for die project to be wortliwhile in view of the extra burden imposed by the increase in taxation. W e obtain:
(2) r = m + d).
If we think of both rand Ras being real returns (returns adjusted for inflation), then if d= 0.48 and R = 0.05, we must have r= 0.05(1 + 0.48) = 0.074. Under these as sumptions, widi a going real rate of return of 5 per cent, a perpetual project fi nanced by increased capital taxation must earn a real rate of return of 7.4 per cent to be justified: an excess of 2.4 per cent over die going real rate of return.
However, while tliis is a major hurdle for an investment project, the penalty is far larger for a government project which involves recurrent expenditure. A recurrent expenditure project must provide a return each year which exceeds its direct cost (including a normal return) by at least die amount of the marginal excess burden. This is equivalent to earning an ongoing real rate of return over and above the normal rate of return by at least die estimated percentage of the marginal excess burden. This is because die return from the project occurs only in die year the expenditure is made, and to maintain an ongoing return die level of capital taxadon has to be raised permanendy.
For example, in 1994 a recurrent expenditure government project (such as a transfer payment) financed by additional capital taxadon should have earned a real rate of return 48 percentage points above die normal real rate of return in order to overcome the adverse effects of increased capital taxadon.
In 1994 die high cost of capital taxadon can be alternadvely illustrated by considering dial a rcducdon in recurrent government expenditure financed by reduced capital taxes would have led to a real rate of return of 48 per cent. There are very few, if any, government projects which can boast such a high real rate of return.
It is important to note, however, dial our study is not saying diat less government spending is always better. The opumal level of government spending is not zero. The government has an important role to play, for example in providing public goods and physical and legal infrastructure diat would not be supplied in desirable quanddes dirough private transacdons. It is wordi incurring die marginal deadweight costs of taxadon up to die point justified by die returns to such expenditure. Our study highlights die high opportunity cost of public funds and die need to spend diose funds very carefully.
More important, these results indicate diat by significandy reducing its capital tax rate Australia can remove some of die compeddve disadvantage it faces compared to its low tax neighbours. The way to attract foodoose, capital-intensive industries to Australia is not to give diem selecdve incendves and to attempt to pick winners but radier to ensure diat Australia's capital tax system is as compeddve as possible across die board. Continuing globalisation and international economic integration means diat Australia has to look at fundamental rebalancing of its tax system to reduce the impost on its most internationally mobile factor, namely, capital.
Appendix: Methodology
There are many approaches to determining die efficiency costs of capital taxation. The approach we take is die following. We assume that the private production sector of the economy uses inputs of capital, labour and imports to produce consumption goods, exports, government purchases of goods and services and investment goods. W e assume that investment goods produced in the current year are added to the capital stock at die beginning of die following year. Domestic households and foreign investors require interest payments in order to induce them to supply financial capital to the production sector.
W e view die business income tax as falling on the return to capital, so that die rate of return that die private production sector must earn is increaded by this capital tax. The effect of the capital tax will be to reduce the equilibrium level of capital, invesUnent and domestic net product. In an equilibrium situation, investment goods are produced so as to just offset depreciation, and an optimal capital stock is one that maximises net output minus interest payments subject to primary resource constraints. Capital taxation moves die economy away from this optimal situation. Our approach to capital taxation is based on that developed by Diewert (1981:65-8; 1988:19-23) .
The construction of die database used in this study largely follows die approach outlined in detail in die appendix to Diewert and Lawrence (1994) , with die excep tion of die treatment of capital and invesUnent goods. The principal data sources for diis study are Australian Bureau of Statistics and Organisation of Economic Co operation and Development (OECD) data contained in Econdata (1996) . The da tabase runs for 28 years from 1966-67 to 1993-94 and die market sector producer model estimated contains twelve goods. These comprise three variable outputs (general private consumption; government consumption of goods and services; and exports), two variable inputs (imports and labour), three invesUnent goods (plant and equipment; non-residential and other construction; and inventories) and four capital stocks (plant and equipment; non-residential and other construction; inven tories; and business and agricultural land).
The characteristics of die production technology are estimated using a variant of die semi-flexible normalised quadratic profit function with curvature imposed and incorporating splines on die technology variable.
